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Abstract
Tools based on static analysis can be used to ﬁnd defects in programs. Tools that do shallow analyses based
on pattern matching have existed since the 1980’s and although they can analyze large programs they have
the drawback of producing a massive amount of warnings that have to be manually analyzed to see if they
are real defects or not. Recent technology advances has brought forward tools that do deeper analyses that
discover more defects and produce a limited amount of false warnings. These tools can still handle large
industrial applications with millions lines of code. This article surveys the underlying supporting technology
of three state-of-the-art static analysis tools. The survey relies on information in research articles and
manuals, and includes the types of defects checked for (such as memory management, arithmetics, security
vulnerabilities), soundness, value and aliasing analyses, incrementality and IDE integration. This survey is
complemented by practical experiences from evaluations at the Ericsson telecom company.
Keywords: Static analysis, dataﬂow analysis, defects, security vulnerabilities.
1 Introduction
Almost all software contain defects. Some defects are found easily while others are
never found, typically because they emerge seldom or not at all. Some defects that
emerge relatively often even go unnoticed simply because they are not perceived as
errors or are not suﬃciently severe. Software defects may give rise to several types
of errors, ranging from logical/functional ones (the program sometimes computes
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incorrect values) to runtime errors (the program typically crashes), or resource leaks
(performance of the program degrades possibly until the program freezes or crashes).
Programs may also contain subtle security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
malicious attackers to gain control over computers.
Fixing defects that suddenly emerge can be extremely costly in particular if
found at the end of the development cycle, or even worse, after deployment. Many
simple defects in programs can be found by modern compilers, but the predominat-
ing method for ﬁnding defects is testing. Testing has the potential of ﬁnding most
types of defects, however, testing is costly and no amount of testing will ﬁnd all
defects. Testing is also problematic because it can be applied only to executable
code, i.e. rather late in the development process. Alternatives to testing, such as
dataﬂow analysis and formal veriﬁcation, have been known since the 1970s but
have not gained widespread acceptance outside academia—that is, until recently;
lately several commercial tools for detecting runtime error conditions at compile
time have emerged. The tools build on static analysis [27] and can be used to ﬁnd
runtime errors as well as resource leaks and even some security vulnerabilities stat-
ically, i.e. without executing the code. This paper is a survey and comparison of
three market leading static analysis tools in 2006/07: PolySpace Veriﬁer, Coverity
Prevent and Klocwork K7. The list is by no means exhaustive, and the list of com-
petitors is steadily increasing, but the three tools represent state-of-the-art in the
ﬁeld at the moment.
The main objective of this study is (1) to identify signiﬁcant static analysis func-
tionality provided by the tools, but not addressed in a normal compiler, and (2) to
survey the underlying supporting technology. The goal is not to provide a ranking
of the tools; nor is it to provide a comprehensive survey of all functionality pro-
vided by the tools. Providing such a ranking is problematic for at least two reasons:
Static analysis is generally only part of the functionality provided by the tool; for
instance, Klocwork K7 supports both refactoring and software metrics which are
not supported by the two other tools. Even if restricting attention only to static
analysis functionality the tools provide largely non-overlapping functionality. Sec-
ondly, even when the tools seemingly provide the same functionality (e.g. detection
of dereferencing of null pointers) the underlying technology is often not comparable;
each tool typically ﬁnds defects which are not found by any of the other tools.
Studying the internals of commercial and proprietary tools is not without prob-
lems; in particular, it is virually impossible to get full information about technical
solutions. However, some technical information is publicly available in manuals
and white papers; some of the tools also originate from academic tools which have
been extensively described in research journals and conference proceedings. While
technical solutions may have changed somewhat since then, we believe that such
information is still largely valid. We have also consulted representatives from all
three providers with the purpose to validate our descriptions of the tools. Still it
must be pointed out that the descriptions of suggested technical solutions is subject
to a certain amount of guessing in some respects.
This technological survey is then complemented by a summary and some exam-
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ples of tool evaluations at Ericsson.
The rest of the report is organized as follows: In Section 2 we deﬁne what we
mean by the term static analysis and survey some elementary concepts and precon-
ditions; in particular, the trade oﬀ between precision and analysis time. In Section
3 we summarize the basic functionality provided by the three tools—Coverity Pre-
vent, Klocwork K7 and PolySpace Veriﬁer/Desktop—focusing in particular on the
support for the C and C++ programming languages. The section also surveys sev-
eral industrial evaluations of the tools over time at Ericsson, in particular involving
the products from Coverity and Klocwork. Section 4 contains conclusions.
2 Static analysis
Languages such as C and, to a lesser extent, C++ are designed primarily with
eﬃciency and portability in mind 4 , and therefore provide little support to avoid or
to deal with runtime errors. For instance, there is no checking in C that read or
write access to an array is within bounds, that dereferencing of a pointer variable
is possible (that the variable is not null) or that type casting is well-deﬁned. Such
checks must therefore be enforced by the programmer. Alternatively we must make
sure that the checks are not needed, i.e. guarantee that the error conditions will
never occur in practice.
By the term static analysis we mean automatic methods to reason about run-
time properties of program code without actually executing it. Properties that we
consider include those which lead to premature termination or ill-deﬁned results of
the program, but precludes for instance purely syntactic properties such as syntax
errors or simple type errors. 5 Nor does static analysis address errors involving
the functional correctness of the software. Hence, static analysis can be used to
check that the program execution is not prematurely aborted due to unexpected
runtime events, but it does not guarantee that the program computes the correct
result. While static analysis can be used to check for e.g. deadlock, timeliness
or non-termination there are other, more specialized, techniques for checking such
properties; although relying on similar principles. Static analysis should be con-
trasted with dynamic analysis which concerns analysis of programs based on their
execution, and includes e.g. testing, performance monitoring, fault isolation and
debugging.
Static analysis does not in general guarantee the absence of runtime errors, and
while it can reduce the need for testing or even detect errors that in practice cannot
be found by testing, it is not meant to replace testing.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of runtime problems that typically cannot
be detected by traditional compilers and may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd by testing, but
which can be found by static analysis:
4 Or so it is often claimed; in fact, even in ANSI/ISO Standard C there are many language constructs
which are not semantically well-deﬁned and which may lead to diﬀerent behavior in diﬀerent compilers.
5 The borderline is not clear; some checks done by compilers, such as type checking in a statically typed
language, are closer to runtime properties than syntactic ones. In fact, in a suﬃciently rich type system
some type checking must be done dynamically.
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• Improper resource management: Resource leaks of various kinds, e.g. dynamically
allocated memory which is not freed, ﬁles, sockets etc. which are not properly
deallocated when no longer used;
• Illegal operations: Division by zero, calling arithmetic functions with illegal values
(e.g. non-positive values to logarithm), over- or underﬂow in arithmetic expres-
sions, addressing arrays out of bounds, dereferencing of null pointers, freeing
already deallocated memory;
• Dead code and data: Code and data that cannot be reached or is not used. This
may be only bad coding style, but may also signal logical errors or misspellings
in the code;
• Incomplete code: This includes the use of uninitialized variables, functions with
unspeciﬁed return values (due to e.g. missing return statements) and incomplete
branching statements (e.g. missing cases in switch statements or missing else
branches in conditional statements).
Other problems checked for by static analysis include non-termination, uncaught
exceptions, race conditions etc.
In addition to ﬁnding errors, static analysis can also be used to produce more
eﬃcient code; in particular for “safe” languages like Java, where eﬃciency was not
the primary objective. Many runtime tests carried out in Java programs can in
practice be avoided given certain information about the runtime behavior. For
instance, tests that array indices are not out-of-bounds can be omitted if we know
that the value of the indices are limited to values in-bounds. Static analysis can
provide such information.
Static analysis can also be used for type inference in untyped or weakly typed
languages or type checking in languages with non-static type systems [21]. Finally
static analysis can be used for debugging purposes (see e.g. [1]), for automatic test
case generation (see e.g. [19]), for impact analysis (see e.g. [26]), intrusion detection
(see e.g. [29]) and for software metrics (see e.g. [30]). However, in this paper we
focus our attention on the use of static analysis for ﬁnding defects and software
vulnerabilities which typically would not show up until the code is executed.
Most interesting properties checked by static analyses are undecidable, meaning that
it is impossible, even in theory, to determine whether an arbitrary program exhibits
the property or not. As a consequence static analyses are inherently imprecise—
they typically infer that a property (e.g. a runtime error) may hold. This implies
that
(i) if a program has a speciﬁc property, the analysis will usually only be able
to infer that the program may have the property. In some special cases the
analysis may also be able to infer that the program does have the property.
(ii) if the program does not have the property, there is a chance that (a) our analysis
is actually able to infer this (i.e. the program does not have the property), but
it may also happen that (b) the analysis infers that the program may have the
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property.
If the property checked for is a defect then we refer to case (ii)(b) as a false positive.
Hence, if the analysis reports that a program may divide by zero we cannot tell in
general whether it is a real problem (item (i)) or if it is a false positive (item (ii)(b)).
The precision of the analysis determines how often false positives are reported. The
more imprecise the analysis is, the more likely it is to generate false positives.
Unfortunately precision usually depends on analysis time. The more precise
the analysis is, the more resource consuming it is, and the longer it takes. Hence,
precision must be traded for time of analysis. This is a very subtle trade-oﬀ—if the
analysis is fast it is likely to report many false positives in which case the alarms
cannot be trusted. On the other hand a very precise analysis is unlikely to terminate
in reasonable time for large programs.
One way to avoid false positives is to ﬁlter the result of the analysis, removing
potential errors which are unlikely (assuming some measure of likelihood). However,
this may result in the removal of positives which are indeed defects. This is known
as a false negative—an actual problem which is not reported. False negatives may
occur for at least two other reasons. The ﬁrst case is if the analysis is too optimistic,
making unjustiﬁed assumptions about the eﬀects of certain operations. For instance,
not taking into account that malloc may return null. The other case which may
result in false negatives is if the analysis is incomplete; not taking account of all
possible execution paths in the program.
There are a number of well-established techniques that can be used to trade-oﬀ
precision and analysis time. A ﬂow-sensitive analysis takes account of the control
ﬂow graph of the program while a ﬂow-insensitive analysis does not. A ﬂow-sensitive
analysis is usually more precise—it may infer that x and y may be aliased (only)
after line 10, while a ﬂow-insensitive analysis only infers that x and y may be
aliased (anywhere within their scope). On the other hand, a ﬂow-sensitive analysis
is usually more time consuming.
A path-sensitive analysis considers only valid paths through the program. It
takes account of values of variables and boolean expressions in conditionals and loops
to prune execution branches which are not possible. A path-insensitive analysis
takes into account all execution paths—even infeasible ones. Path-sensitivity usually
implies higher precision but is usually more time consuming.
A context-sensitive analysis takes the context—e.g. global variables and actual
parameters of a function call—into account when analyzing a function. This is also
known as inter-procedural analysis in contrast to intra-procedural analysis which
analyses a function without any assumptions about the context. Intra-procedural
analyses are much faster but suﬀer from greater imprecision than inter-procedural
analyses.
Path- and context-sensitivity rely on the ability to track possible values of pro-
gram variables; for instance, if we do not know the values of the variables in the
boolean expression of a conditional, then we do not know whether to take the then-
branch or the else-branch. Such value analysis can be more or less sophisticated; it
is common to restrict attention to intervals (e.g. 0 < x < 10), but some approaches
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rely on more general relations between several variables (e.g. x > y+z). Another
important issue is aliasing (see e.g. [14,28]); when using pointers or arrays the value
of a variable can be modiﬁed by modifying the value of another variable. Without
a careful value and aliasing analyses we will typically have large numbers of false
positives, or one has do ungrounded, optimistic assumptions about the values of
variables.
The undecidability of runtime properties implies that it is impossible to have
an analysis which always ﬁnds all defects and produces no false positives. A frame-
work for static analysis is said to be sound (or conservative or safe) if all defects
checked for are reported, i.e. there are no false negatives but there may be false
positives. 6 Traditionally, most frameworks for static analysis have aimed for sound-
ness while trying to avoid excessive reporting of false positives (e.g. the products
from PolySpace). However, most commercial systems today (e.g. Coverity Prevent
and Klocwork K7) are not sound (i.e. they will not ﬁnd all actual defects) and also
typically produce false positives.
It is sometimes claimed that static analysis can be applied to incomplete code
(individual ﬁles and/or procedures). While there is some truth to this, the quality
of such an analysis may be arbitrarily bad. For instance, if the analysis does not
know how a procedure or subprogram in existing code is called from outside it
must, to be sound, assume that the procedure is called in an arbitrary way, thus
analyzing executions that probably cannot occur when the missing code is added.
This is likely to lead to false positives. Similarly incomplete code may contain a
call to a procedure which is not available, either because it is not yet written, or it
is a proprietary library function. Such incomplete code can be analyzed but is also
likely to lead to a large number of false positives and/or false negatives depending
on if the analysis makes pessimistic or optimistic assumptions about the missing
code.
On the positive side, it is often not necessary to provide complete code for
missing functions or function calls. It is often suﬃcient to provide a stub or a
top-level function that mimics the eﬀects of the properties checked for.
The tools studied in this report adopt diﬀerent approaches to deal with incom-
plete code and incremental analysis when only some code has been modiﬁed (as
discussed in the next section).
3 A comparison of the tools
Shallow static analysis tools based on pattern matching such as FlexeLint [17] have
existed since the late 1980s. Lately several sophisticated industrial-strength static
analysis tools have emerged. In this report we study tools from three of the main
6 Soundness can be used in two completely diﬀerent senses depending on if the focus is on the reporting of
defects or on properties of executions. In the former (less common) sense soundness would mean that all
positives are indeed defects, i.e. there are no false positives. However, the more common sense, and the one
used here, is that soundness refers to the assumptions made about the possible executions. Even if there is
only a small likelihood that a variable takes on a certain value (e.g. x=0) we do not exclude that possibility.
Hence if the analysis infers that X may be zero in an expression 1/x, there is a possibility that there will be
a runtime error; otherwise not. This is why a sound analysis may actually result in false positives, but no
false negatives.
P. Emanuelsson, U. Nilsson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 5–2110
providers—PolySpace, Coverity and Klocwork. There are several other static anal-
ysis tools around, including PREﬁx/PREfast from Microsoft [3], Astree [7], which
are not as widely available. A tool which has existed for some years but not un-
til recently has become commercially available is CodeSonar from Grammatech,
founded by Tim Teitelbaum and Tom Reps, which is similar in style and ambition
level to Coverity Prevent and Klocwork K7, see [18]. Even if we focus here on tools
intended for global and “deep” (=semantic) analysis of code, more lightweight tools
like FlexeLint may still be useful in more interactive use and for local analysis.
There are also dynamic tools that aim for discovering some of the kinds of defects
as the static analysis tools do. For example Insure++ [22] and Rational Purify [24]
detect memory corruption errors.
A rough summary of major features of the three systems studied here can be
found in Table 1. Such a table is by necessity incomplete and simplistic and in the
following sub-section we elaborate on the most important diﬀerences and similari-
ties. A more thorough exposition of the tools can be found in the full version of the
paper, see [16].
3.1 Functionality provided
While all three tools have much functionality in common, there are noticeable dif-
ferences; in particular when comparing PolySpace Veriﬁer [15,23] against Coverity
Prevent [10,11] and Klocwork K7 [20]. The primary aim of all three tools obviously
is to ﬁnd real defects, but in doing so any tool will also produce some false positives
(i.e. false alarms). While Coverity and Klocwork are prepared to sacriﬁce ﬁnding
all bugs in favor of reducing the number of false positives, PolySpace is not; as a
consequence the former two will in general produce relatively few false positives but
will also typically have some false negatives (defects which are not reported). It is
almost impossible to quantify the rate of false negatives/positives; Coverity claims
that approximately 20 to 30 per cent of the defects reported are false positives.
Klocwork K7 seems to produce a higher rate of false positives, but stays in approx-
imately the same league. However, the rate of false positives obviously depends on
the quality of the code. The rate of false negatives is even more diﬃcult to estimate,
since it depends even more on the quality of the code. (Obviously there will be no
false negatives if the code is already free of defects.) According to Coverity the rate
of defect reports is typically around 1 defect per 1-2 KLoC.
PolySpace, on the other hand, does in general mark a great deal of code in
orange color which means that it may contain a defect, as opposed to code that
is green (no defects), red (deﬁnite defect) or grey (dead code). If orange code
is considered a potential defect then PolySpace Veriﬁer produces a high rate of
false positives. However, this is a somewhat unfair comparison; while Coverity and
Klocwork do not even give the developer the opportunity to inspect all potential
defects, PolySpace provides that opportunity and provides instead a methodology
in which the developer can systematically inspect orange code and classify it either
as correct or faulty. In other words, Coverity and Klocwork are likely to “ﬁnd
some bugs”, but provide no guarantees—the rest of the code may contain defects
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which are not even reported by the tool. PolySpace on the other hand can provide
guarantees—if all code is green (or grey) it is known not to contain any bugs (wrt
the properties checked for, that is). On the other hand it may be hard to eliminate
all orange code.
All three tools rely at least partly on inter-procedural analyses, but the ambi-
tion level varies signiﬁcantly. PolySpace uses the most advanced technical solution
where relationships between variables are approximated by convex polyhedra [8] and
all approximations are sound—that is, no execution sequences are forgotten, but
some impossible execution paths may be analyzed due to the approximations made.
Coverity Prevent and Klocwork K7 account only of interval ranges of variables in
combination with “simple” relationships between variables in a local context with
the main purpose to prune some infeasible execution paths, but do not do as well as
PolySpace. Global variables and nontrivial aliasing are not accounted for or treated
only in a restricted way. As a consequence neither Coverity nor Klocwork take all
possible behaviors into account which is one source of false negatives. It is some-
what unclear how Coverity Prevent and Klocwork K7 compare with each other, but
impression is that the former does a more accurate analysis.
Another consequence of the restricted tracking of arithmetic values of variables
in Coverity Prevent and Klocwork K7 is that the products are not suitable for
detecting arithmetic defects, such as over- and underﬂows or illegal operations like
division by zero. The products did not even provide arithmetic checkers at the time
of the study. PolySpace on the other hand does provide several arithmetic checkers,
setting it apart from the others.
While PolySpace is the only tool that provides arithmetic checkers, it is also the
only one among the three which does not provide any checkers for resource leaks;
in particular there is no support for discovering defects in dynamic management
(allocation and deallocation) of memory. As a consequence there are also no checkers
e.g. for “use-after-free”. This lack can perhaps be explained by PolySpace’s focus
on the embedded systems market, involving safety or life critical applications where
no dynamic allocation of memory is possible or allowed.
While PolySpace appears to be aiming primarily for the embedded systems mar-
ket, Klocwork and Coverity have targeted in particular networked systems and ap-
plications as witnessed, for instance, by a range of security checkers. Klocwork and
Coverity address essentially the same sort of security issues ranging from simple
checks that critical system calls are not used inappropriately to more sophisticated
analyses involving buﬀer overruns (which is also supported by PolySpace) and the
potential use of so-called tainted (untrusted) data. The focus on networked appli-
cation also explains the support for analyzing resource leaks since dynamic manage-
ment of resources such as sockets, streams and memory is an integral part of most
networked applications.
Coverity supports incremental analysis of a whole system, where only parts
have been changed since last analysis. Results of an analysis are saved and reused
in subsequent analyses. An automatic impact analysis is done to detect and, if
necessary, re-analyze other parts of the code aﬀected indirectly by the change. Such
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Table 1
Summary of features of Coverity Prevent, Klocwork K7 and PolySpace Veriﬁer
Functionality Coverity KlocWork PolySpace
Coding style No Some No
Buffer overrun Yes Yes Yes
Arithmetic over/underflow No No Yes
Illegal shift operations No No Yes
Undefined arithmetic operations No No Yes
Bad return value Yes Yes Yes
Memory/resource leaks Yes Yes No
Use after free Yes Yes No
Uninitialized variables Yes Yes Yes
Size mismatch Yes Yes Yes
Stack use Yes No No
Dead code/data Yes Yes Yes (code)
Null pointer dereference Yes Yes Yes
STL checkers Some Some No?
Uncaught exceptions Beta (C++) No No
User assertions No No Yes
Function pointers No No Yes
Nontermination No No Yes
Concurrency Lock order No Shared data
Tainted data Yes Yes No
Time-of-check Time-of-use Yes Yes No
Unsafe system calls Yes Yes No
MISRA support No No Yes
Extensible Yes Some No
Incremental analysis Yes No No
False positives Few Few Many
False negatives Yes Yes No
Software metrics No Yes No
Language support C/C++ C/C++/Java C/C++/Ada
an incremental analysis may take signiﬁcantly less time than analyzing the whole
system from scratch. With the other tools analysis of the whole system has to be
redone. All of the tools provide the possibility to analyze a single ﬁle. However
such an analysis will be much more shallow than analyzing a whole system where
complete paths of execution can be analyzed.
Both Klocwork and Coverity provide means for writing user deﬁned checkers and
integrating them with the analysis tools, see e.g. [9,4]. However, the APIs are non-
P. Emanuelsson, U. Nilsson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 5–21 13
trivial and writing new, non-trivial checkers is both cumbersome and error prone.
There are no explicit guidelines for writing correct checkers and no documented
support for manipulation of abstract values (e.g. interval constraints). There is also
no support for reusing the results of other checkers. Termination of the checker is
another issue which may be problematic for users not familiar with the mathematical
foundations of static analysis, see e.g. [6,27].
All three tools support analysis of the C programming language and C++. At
the initial time of this study only Klocwork supported analysis of Java but Coverity
was announcing a new version of Prevent with support for Java. Only PolySpace
supported analysis of Ada. Klocwork was the only provider which claimed to handle
mixed language applications (C/C++/Java).
The downside of PolySpace’s sophisticated mechanisms for tracking variable val-
ues is that the tool cannot deal automatically with very large code bases without
manual partitioning of the code. While Coverity Prevent and Klocwork K7 are able
to analyze millions of lines of code oﬀ-the-shelf and overnight, PolySpace seems to
reach the complexity barrier already at around 50 KLoC with the default settings.
On the other hand PolySpace advocates analyzing code in a modular fashion. Anal-
ysis time is typically not linear in the number of lines of code—analyzing 10 modules
of 100 KLoC is typically orders of magnitude faster than analyzing a single program
consisting of 1,000 KLoC. However this typically involves human intervention and
well-deﬁned interfaces (which may be beneﬁcial for other quality reasons...)
On the more exotic side Coverity provides a checker for stack use. It is unclear
how useful this is since there is no uniform way of allocating stack memory in
diﬀerent compilers. Klocwork is claimed to provide similar functionality but in a
separate tool. PolySpace set themselves aside from the others by providing checkers
for non termination, both of functions and loops. Again it is unclear how useful such
checkers are considering the great amount of research done on dedicated algorithms
for proving termination of programs (see e.g. [13,2]). Coverity has a checker for
uncaught exceptions in C++ which was still a beta release. PolySpace provides
a useful feature in their support for writing general assertions in the code. Such
assertions are useful both for writing stubs and may also be used for proving partial
correctness also of functional properties; see [25].
None of the tools provide very sophisticated support for dealing with concur-
rency. Klocwork currently provides no support at all. Coverity is able to detect
some cases of mismatched locks but does not take concurrency into account dur-
ing analysis of concurrent threads. The only tool which provides more substantial
support is PolySpace which is able to detect shared data and whether that data is
protected or not.
Both Coverity and Klocwork have developed lightweight versions of their tools
aimed for frequent analysis during development. These have been integrated with
Eclipse IDEs. However the defect databases for Coverity and Klocwork have not
been integrated into Eclipse IDEs or TPTP. PolySpace has integrated with the
Rhapsody UML tool to provide a UML static analysis tool. It analyzes generated
code and links back references to the UML model to point out where defects have
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been detected. Besides that PolySpace has its general C++ level advantages with a
sound analysis (no false negatives) and presumably problems with analyzing large
code bases (larger than 50-100 KLoC)—a restriction which should be more severe
in the UML situation compared to hand-coded C++.
3.2 Experiences at Ericsson
A number of independent evaluations of static analysis tools were performed by de-
velopment groups at Ericsson. Coverity was evaluated by several groups. Klocwork
has also been subject to evaluations but not quite as many. There was an attempt
to use PolySpace for one of the smallest applications, but the evaluation was not
successful; the tool has either presented no results within reasonable time (a couple
of days’ execution) or the results were too weak to be of use (too much orange code
to analyze). We do not know if this was due to the tool itself or to the actual
conﬁguration of the evaluations. It would have been valuable to compare results
from PolySpace, which is sound, to those of Klocwork and Coverity. Perhaps that
would give some hint on the false negative rate in Klocwork and Coverity.
Some general experiences from use of Coverity and Klocwork were:
• The tools are easy to install and get going. The development environment is easy
to adapt and no incompatible changes in tools or processes are needed.
• The tools are able to ﬁnd bugs that would hardly be found otherwise.
• It is possible to analyze even large applications with several million lines of code
and the time it takes is comparable to build time.
• Even for large applications the false positive rate is manageable.
• Several users had expected the tools to ﬁnd more defects and defects that were
more severe. On the other hand, several users were surprised that the tools found
bugs even in applications that had been tested for a long time. There might be a
diﬀerence in what users ﬁnd reasonable to expect from these tools. There might
also be large diﬀerences in what users classify as a false positive, a bug or a severe
bug.
• It is acceptable to use tools with a high false positive rate (such as FlexeLint) if
the tool is introduced in the beginning of development and then used continuously.
• It is unacceptable to use tools with a high false positive rate if the product is
large and the tool is introduced late in the development process.
• Many of the defects found could not cause a crash in the system as it was deﬁned
and used at the moment. However if the system would be only slightly changed
or the usage was changed the defect could cause a serious crash. Therefore these
problems should be ﬁxed anyway.
• Even if the tools look for the same categories of defects, for instance memory
leaks, addressing out of array bounds etc, the defects found in a given category
by one tool can be quite diﬀerent from those found by another tool.
• Handling of third party libraries can make a big diﬀerence to analysis results.
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Declarations for commercial libraries that come with the analysis tool can make
the analysis of own code more precise. If source for the library is available defects
in the library can be uncovered, which may be as important to the quality of the
whole application as the own code.
• There are several aspects of the tools that are important when making a tool
selection that has not been a part of the comparison in this paper; such as pricing,
ease of use, integration in IDEs, other functionality, interactiveness etc.
Below follows some more speciﬁc results from some of the evaluations. We do not
publish exact numbers of code sizes and found bugs etc for conﬁdentiality reasons
since some of the applications are commercial products in use.
Evaluation 1 (Coverity and FlexeLint): The chosen application had been
thoroughly tested, both with manually designed tests and systematic tests that were
generated from descriptions. FlexeLint was applied and produced roughly 1,200,000
defect reports. The defects could be reduced to about 1,000 with a great deal of
analysis and following ﬁltering work. These then had to be manually analyzed.
Coverity was applied to the same piece of code and found about 40 defects; there
were very few false positives and some real bugs. The users appreciated the low
false positive rate. The opinion was that the defects would hardly have been found
by regular testing.
The users had expected Coverity to ﬁnd more defects. It was believed that there
should be more bugs to be found by static analysis techniques. It was not known if
this was the price paid for the low false positive rate or if the analyzed application
actually contained only a few defects. The users also expected Coverity to ﬁnd more
severe defects. Many of the ﬁndings were not really defects, but code that simply
should be removed, such as declarations of variables that were never used. Other
defects highlighted situations that could not really occur since the code was used in
a restricted way not known to the analysis tool.
Evaluation 2 (Coverity): A large application was analyzed with Coverity. Part
of the code had been previously analyzed with FlexeLint. The application had been
extensively tested.
Coverity was perceived both as easy to install and use, and no modiﬁcations to
existing development environment was needed. The error reports from the analysis
were classiﬁed as follows
• 55 per cent were no real defects but perceived only as poor style,
• 2 per cent were false positives,
• 38 per cent were considered real bugs, and 1 per cent were considered severe.
The users appreciated that a fair number of defects were found although the code
had already been thoroughly tested.
Evaluation 3 (Coverity and Klocwork): An old version of an application that
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was known to have some memory leaks was analyzed using Coverity and Klocwork.
In total Klocwork reported 32 defects including 10 false positives and Coverity
reported 16 defects including 1 false positive. Only three defects were common to
both tools! Hence Klocwork found more defects, but also had a larger false positive
rate. Although the tools looked for similar defects the ones actually found were
largely speciﬁc to each tool. This suggests that each of the tools fail in ﬁnding
many defects.
Looking at only the memory leaks the results were similar. Klocwork reported
12 defects of which 8 were false, totalling 4 real defects and Coverity reported 7
defects all of which were true defects. None of the tools found any of the known
memory leaks.
Evaluation 4 (Coverity and Klocwork): Old versions of two C++ products
were analyzed with Coverity and Klocwork. Trouble reports for defects that had
been detected by testing were available. One purpose was to compare how many
faults each of the tools found. Another purpose was to estimate how many of the
faults discovered in testing were found by the static analysis tools.
Coverity found signiﬁcantly more faults and also had signiﬁcantly less false pos-
itives than Klocwork. One of the major reasons for this was the handling of third
party libraries. Coverity analyzed the existing source code for the libraries and
found many faults in third party code! Klocwork did not analyze this code and
hence did not ﬁnd any of these faults. Besides that the analysis of the libraries that
Coverity did resulted in fewer false positives in the application code since it could
be derived that certain scenarios could not occur.
The time of analyses was about the same as build time for both tools—i.e. is
good enough for overnight batch runs but not for daily, interactive use during de-
velopment.
Both tools lacked integration with CM tool Clearcase, the source code had to be
copied into the repository of the analysis tools. There was no way to do inspection
of analysis results from an IDE, but the reviews had to be done in the GUI of the
analysis tools.
Coverity was preferred by the C++ developers. It had incremental analysis that
would save time and it could easily analyze and report on single components.
Although the main part of the evaluation was on old code some studies were done
on programs during the development. The development code had more warnings
and most of them were real faults; most of these were believed to have been found
during function test. It had been anticipated that more faults would be found in
low level components, but these components proved to be stable and only a few
defects were discovered. More faults were however found in high level components
with more frequent changes.
Evaluation 5 (Coverity, Klocwork and CodePro): A Java product with
known bugs was analyzed. A beta version of Coverity Prevent with Java analysis
capabilities was used. None of the known bugs were found by the tools. Coverity
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found more real faults and had far less false positives than Klocwork. For Coverity
one third of the warnings were real bugs.
Klocwork generated many warnings; 7 times the number of warnings of Coverity.
The missing analysis of the third party library seemed to be the major reason.
However, Klocwork does a ranking of the potential defects and when only the four
most severe levels of warnings were considered the results were much better—there
were few false positives.
CodePro Analytix (developed and marketed by Instantiations) is a tool aimed
for analysis during development. It is integrated into the Eclipse IDE and the results
of an analysis cannot be persistently saved, but only exist during the development
session with the IDE. The analysis is not as deep as that of Coverity or Clockwork,
but is faster and can easily be done interactively during development. The tool
generates a great deal of false positives, but these can be kept at a tolerable level
by choosing an appropriate set of analysis rules. No detailed analysis was done of
the number of faults and if they were real faults or not.
In this evaluation there was a large diﬀerence in the number of warnings gener-
ated, Coverity 92 warnings, Klocwork 658 warnings (in the top four severities 19),
CodePro 8,000 warnings (with all rules activated).
4 Conclusions
Static analysis tools for detection of runtime defects and security vulnerabilities can
roughly be categorized as follows
• String and pattern matching approaches: Tools in this category rely mainly
on syntactic pattern matching techniques; the analysis is typically path- and
context-insensitive. Analyses are therefore shallow, taking little account of se-
mantic information except user annotations, if present. Tools typically generate
large volumes of false positives as well as false negatives. Tools (often derivatives
of the lint program) have been around for many years, e.g. FlexeLint, PC-Lint
and Splint. Since the analysis is shallow it is possible to analyze very large pro-
grams, but due to the high rate of false positives an overwhelming amount of
post-processing may be needed. These tools are in our opinion more useful for
providing almost immediate feedback in interactive use and in combination with
user annotations.
• Unsound dataﬂow analyses: This category of tools which have emerged re-
cently rely on semantic information; not just syntactic pattern matching. Tools
are typically path- and context-sensitive but the precision is limited so in prac-
tice the tools have to analyze also many impossible paths or make more-or-less
justiﬁed guesses what paths are (im-)possible. This implies that analyses are
unsound. Aliasing analysis is usually only partly implemented, and tracking of
possible variable values is limited; global variables are sometimes not tracked at
all. A main objective of the tools, represented e.g. by Coverity Prevent and Kloc-
work K7, is to reduce the number of false positives and to allow for analysis of
very large code bases. The low rate of false positives (typically 20–30 per cent
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in Coverity Prevent) is achieved by a combination of a unsound analysis and ﬁl-
tering of the error reports. The downside is the presence of false negatives. It is
impossible to quantify the rate since it depends very much on the quality of the
code, but in several evaluations Coverity and Klocwork ﬁnd largely disjoint sets
of defects. This category of tools provide no guarantees—the error reports may
or may not be real defects (it has to be checked by the user), and code which is
not complained upon may still be defective. However, the tools will typically ﬁnd
some bugs which are hard to ﬁnd by other techniques.
• Sound dataﬂow analyses: Tools in this category are typically path- and
context-sensitive. However, imprecision may lead to analysis of some infeasi-
ble paths. They typically have sophisticated mechanisms to track aliasing and
relationships between variables including global ones. The main diﬃculty is to
avoid excessive generation of false positives by being as precise as possible while
analysis time scales. The only commercial system that we are aware of which has
taken this route is PolySpace Veriﬁer/Desktop. The great advantage of a sound
analysis is that it gives some guarantees: if the tool does not complain about
some piece of code (the code is green in PolySpace jargon) then that piece of
code must be free of the defects checked for.
There is a forth category of tools which we have not discussed here—namely tools
based on model checking techniques [5]. Model checking, much like static analysis,
facilitates traversal and analysis of all reachable states of a system (e.g. a piece
of software), but in addition to allowing for checking of runtime properties, model
checking facilitates checking of functional properties (e.g. safety properties) and also
so-called temporal properties (liveness, fairness and real-time properties). There
are commercial tools for model checking hardware systems, but because of eﬃciency
issues there are not yet serious commercial competitors for software model checking.
It is clear that the eﬃciency and quality of static analysis tools have reached
a maturity level were static analysis is not only becoming a viable complement
to software testing but is in fact a required step in the quality assurance of certain
types of applications. There are many examples where static analysis has discovered
serious defects and vulnerabilities that would have been very hard to ﬁnd using
ordinary testing; the most striking example is perhaps the Scan Project [12] which
is a collaboration between Stanford and Coverity that started in March, 2006 and
has reported on more than 7,000 defects in a large number of open-source projects
(e.g. Apache, Firebird, FreeBSD/Linux, Samba) during the ﬁrst 18 months.
However, there is still substantial room for improvement. Sound static analysis
approaches, such as that of PolySpace, still cannot deal well with very large code
bases without manual intervention and they produce a large number of false posi-
tives even with very advanced approximation techniques to avoid loss of precision.
Unsound tools, on the other hand, such as those from Coverity and Klocwork do
scale well, albeit not to the level of interactive use. The number of false positives is
surprisingly low and clearly at an acceptable level. The price to be paid is that they
are not sound, and hence, provide no guarantees: they may (and most likely will)
ﬁnd some bugs, possibly serious ones. But the absence of error reports from such a
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tool only means that the tool was unable to ﬁnd any potential defects. As witnessed
in the evaluations diﬀerent unsound tools tend to ﬁnd largely disjoint defects and
are also known not to ﬁnd known defects. Hence, analyzed code is likely to contain
dormant bugs which can only be found by a sound analysis.
Most of the evaluations of the tools have been carried out on more or less ma-
ture code. We believe that to fully ripe the beneﬁts of the tools they should not be
used only at the end of the development process (after testing and/or after using
e.g. FlexeLint), but should probably be used throughout the development process.
However, the requirements on the tools are quite diﬀerent at an early stage com-
pared to at acceptance testing. Some vendors “solve” the problem by providing
diﬀerent tools, such as PolySpace Desktop and PolySpace Veriﬁer. However, we
rather advocate giving the user means of ﬁne-tuning the behavior of the analysis
engine. A user of the tools today has very limited control over precision and the rate
of false positives and false negatives—there are typically a few levels of precision
available, but the user is basically in the hands of the tools. It would be desirable
for the user to have better control over precision of the analyses. There should for
example be a mechanism to ﬁne-tune the eﬀort spent on deriving value ranges of
variables and the eﬀort spent on aliasing analysis. For some users and in certain
situations it would be acceptable to spend ﬁve times more analysis time in order
to detect more defects. Before an important release it could be desirable to spend
much more time than on the day to day analysis runs. In code under development
one can possibly live with some false negatives and non-optimal precision as long as
the tool “ﬁnds some bugs”. As the code develops one can improve the precision and
decrease the rate of false positives and negatives; in particular in an incremental tool
such as Coverity Prevent. Similarly it would be desirable to have some mechanism
to control the aggressiveness of ﬁltering of error reports.
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